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iiiAbstract
Economic transition in Bulgaria has been associated with the emergence of unemployment, the fall
in real wages  and a substantial increase in wage inequality. The ranks of low paid workers have
grown,  and  their  relative  wage  status  has  substantially deteriorated.  Unemployment  is of long
duration. A part of the problem  is that the unemployed have excessive wage  expectations.  Their
reservation  wages  far  exceed  the  wages  that  employers  actually  offer  for  people  of  given
qualifications.  The  reservation  wages  hardly  fall  with  the  duration  of  unemployment,  which
implies that job  search is not  adaptive.  The receipt of unemployment benefits  does  not seem to
reduce the job  search effort.  The transition hit the hardest the low skilled workers  among whom
both the incidence of unemployment and low-pay is the highest.  Poverty in Bulgaria tends to be a
result of  both  low  (relative) earnings  and low household  labor supply,  which  often go hand in
hand. However,  work does not keep families out of poverty:  the 'working poor'  account for one-
third  of  all  poor.  Moreover,  poverty  incidence  is  quite  high  even among  families  with  two
earners.  Thus,  Bulgaria does  not conform to the usually observed pattern  whereby  two earners
effectively protect against poverty.
ivII.  LABOR FORCE DEVELOPMENTS AND
UNEMPLOYMENT
Changes in the labor force
1.  Since  1995 the  labor  market  in Bulgaria  has  been  slack but  relatively  stable
(Table  1.1).  The labor  force participation rate  has remained at  a  low  level  of 52%,
reflecting in part the discouraged worker effect.  The unemployment rate in June 1995
was 2 percentage points lower than in two years earlier.'  This fall could be deemed as an
achievement,  however  it  reflects  stalled and  delayed  restructuring  rather  than a  more
dynamic labor market.  The employment rate has not increased and is ratcheted at a low
level: only 45 of working age population in Bulgaria have jobs.  All these figures present
a picture of a stagnant labor market with limited employment opportunities.  It is not only
unemployment  that is  a problem, but also a  low labor force participation,  which both
signify underutilization of labor resources.
Table 1.1 Changes in the labor force, 1994-1997
1994  1995  1996  1997
Labor force  53.4  52.2  52.5  51.9
participation rate
Unemployment rate  20.0  15.7  13.5  13.7
Employment rate  42.7  44.0  45.4  44.8
Notes:
1. June data
2. Labor force  participation  rate = (Employment  + Unemployment)/Population  aged 15+
D  Employment  rate  = Employment/Population  aged 15+
4.  Unemployment  rate = Unemployment/Labor  force
Source:  Employment  and Unemployment,  various  years,  NSI.
2.  Labor market transitions.  Transitions across employment, unemployment and
inactivity  are  low,  which  is  yet  another  indication  of  the  stagnant  labor  market  in
Bulgaria (Table 1.2).  In particular, the probability that an unemployed person will find a
job  within twelve months  is extremely low, amounting  to 6.2%.  This  is roughly one-
sixth of the yearly exit rate from unemployment observed in Poland,  and less than one-
eight of those prevailing in high-unemployment European countries such as Spain (Boeri,
1998).  An unemployed person in Bulgaria has  an extremely low chance to find a job.
Many of the unemployed  (11%) become discouraged by the futility of their job  search
and withdrew from the labor force.
i  The data come  from the Labor Force  Survey,  which in principle  should  cover employment  in  the
informal  sector.
13.  At the same time, the yearly inflow  into unemployment is moderate, similar  to
that observed in  Poland.  A probability that  an employed person  becomes unemployed
within a year is 3.5%. Given the substantial labor market slack, the flow from inactivity
to employment or unemployment is very low (about 1%). Few people decide to enter the
labor market, and even fewer succeed.
Table 1.2  Yearly labor market flows, 1996/1997
Presently
12 months ago  Employed  Unemployed  Inactive
Employed  94.5  3.5  2.0
Unemployed  6.2  82.5  11.3
Inactive  1.0  0.7  98.3
Source:  IHS 1997.
4.  Thus, unemployment in Bulgaria is a large stagnant pool.  This  is reflected in a
high incidence of long term unemployment and a long duration of job search (Table 1.3).
Six out of ten unemployed are jobless for more than one year.  Four out of ten are jobless
for  more  than  two  years.  The  steady-state  average  duration  of  a  completed
unemployment spell is 35 months, and has increased since 1995.2
Table 1.3 Duration of unemployment
Duration, months  1995  1997
In percent
Less than I month  3.1  2.9
1 - 5  17.3  19.9
6-  11  12.0  15.0
12-23  19.0  18.5
24 +  48.5  43.7
Steady-state average duration  32  35
(months)
Note: The number  of unemployed  who  have  duration  of less  than one month have been taken  as the
monthly  inflow. Average duration  of a completed  unemployment  spell  was estimated  under  the
assumption  that inflow  = outflow  (steady-state).
Source:  Employment  and Unemployment,  2/'95 and 2/'97, NSI,  Sofia.
2  That is, it is assumed  that outflow  from unemployment  equals inflow to unemployment  (steady
state). If the unemployment  is growing  - which  seems to be the case in Bulgaria  - then the actual  duration
of completed  unemployment  spells  is longer  than that estimated  under  the assumption  of the steady  state.
25.  The  large  pool  of the  long-term  unemployed - over  300,000  people  - is  a
particularly  worrisome  feature  of  the  Bulgarian  labor  market. 3 The  long  term
unemployed  are  disproportionately  persons  with  low  skills:  45%  of  them  have  only
primary or lower education.  The skills they possess and their motivation tend to erode as
joblessness  persists.  Moreover, employers tend to treat  long duration of unemployment
spells  as  a  signal  of  intrinsically  low  productivity.  These  factors  cause  that  the
probability of finding a job decreases with the duration of unemployment.
6.  Thus, there is an incipient danger that a relatively  large group of persons with
limited  employability  will develop.  The  capacity of  the  Bulgarian  labor market  to
reintegrate a large number of jobseekers  into gainful and  productive  employment may
prove to be severely limited, even when  the economic growth resumes.  According to
existing evidence, increasing demand for labor has relatively  little impact of flows from
unemployment  to jobs  (Boeri, 1995).  The long-term  unemployed  are at a  particular
disadvantage, likely to lose the competition  for jobs to those who have better skills and
are not stigmatized by unemployment.
7.  Profile  of unemployment.  The  logit regression  allows one to determine a net
(independent of other variables) impact of different variables  on the probability of being
4 unemployed (Table 1.4).  Persons running the highest risk of unemployment are young,
with low educational attainment, of Gypsy ethnicity.  The role of educational attainment
is  particularly  pronounced:  a  worker  with  primary  education  faces  odds  of  being
unemployed 4 times higher than a worker  with an university  diploma, 2.3 times higher
than a worker with secondary vocational  education, and  1.9 times higher than a worker
with  secondary  general  education.  Secondary earners  (especially  children)  are more
likely  to  be  unemployed  than  primary  earners (household  heads).  The odds  that  a
son/daughter is unemployed are 1.4 times higher than that of the household head.  Single
persons are more likely to be unemployed  than married  ones.  Ceteris paribus,  women
are not at a significantly higher risk of unemployment than men.
8.  This  profile  of  unemployment  is  similar to  that  observed  in  other  European
countries.  Two  features  deserve  to  be  highlighted:  (a)  the  strong  link  between
unemployment and educational attainment, and (b) a higher risk of unemployment among
secondary earners compared with primary earners.  The first factor suggests investment
in education is the best protection against unemployment,  and in consequence poverty.
The second factor probably mitigates  the impact of unemployment  on poverty, although
the relationship between poverty and  the family status of an unemployed person is not
straightforward.'
Long-term  unemployment  is defined  as unemployment  lasting for more  than one year.
4  Pissarides and Wadsworth (1990) contains  similar analysis for the UK, and Rutkowski (1998) for FYR
Macedonia.
5  As documented later, household with an  unemployed secondary  member are more likely to be  poor
than households with an unemployed head.  A likely cause of this  apparently paradoxical relationship  is
that in poor families secondary earners have to look for a job, while  in non-poor families they can afford to
be out of the  labor force, or have less problems  with finding a job  (for example. because they  are better
educated).  Thus,  in this  case causality runs  from poverty to  unemployment,  rather than the  other way
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The skills gap
9.  The high share of poorly educated people in unemployment in Bulgaria points to
the problem of the skills gap.  The comparison of the skill and educational composition of
employment  with  that  of  unemployment  reveals  that  workers  with  low  skills  and
educational attainment account for a disproportionate share of unemployment (Table 1.5).
For example, workers with only primary education account for over 40% the unemployed
and for  only 25%  of the  employed.  This indicates  an  disproportionately large  excess
supply of low skilled, poorly educated labor.
10.  The skills gap turns out to be an important - although not a predominant - cause
of unemployment in Bulgaria.  Assuming that economic growth will replicate the existing
4employment  structure 6 (which  in  the  longer  run  is  probably  an  optimistic  scenario,
because  in  reality  skilled  jobs  tend  to  grow  faster  than  unskilled),  and  that  skill
mismatches  exist only between skill categories (that  is neglecting a possible  mismatch
within  skill categories, which again is an optimistic assumption) it turns out that about 17
percent  of the unemployed will not be able to find jobs due to inadequate skills.  In other
words,  one of every six unemployed may not be able to find employment even if there is
enough  vacancies because the  skills/education  he  or  she possesses  fall  short  of  skills
demanded  by employers. Put still differently, the unemployment rate due to the skills gap
is 2.6%.  These figures provide an lower-bound estimate of the extent of the magnitude of
the skills gap because of the best-case scenario.  On the positive side, the skills gap has
remained at roughly the same level since 1995.
Table  1.5  Composition of employment and unemployment by educational
attainment, 1997
Education  Employ-  Unemplo  "Excess
ment  yment  supply"
University  15.6  5.7  -9.8
College  5.9  2.6  -3.3
Secondary vocational  22.3  18.2  -4.1
Secondary general  31.7  32.5  0.8
Primary or less  24.5  40.9  16.4
Source: Employment and Unemployment, 2/'97, NSI, Sofia
Job search of the unemployed
11.  On the supply side, the probability of finding a job depends on two factors: (a) job
search intensity, and (b) the reservation wage, that is the lowest wage that an unemployed
person is willing to accept.
12.  Job search intensity.  The time spent on job  search amounts on average to  18
hours  per  week. 7 However, this  average conceals  large differences.  The median job
seeker devotes to the job search only 4 hours.  Many of the unemployed  (15%) do not
actively look for a job at all.  A suspiciously large fraction (28%) of jobseekers  say they
spend on job search 56 hours per week. 8 Insofar as this is indeed the case, the job search
is a full-time job: 8 hours per day, 6 days per week.
13.  The job  search intensity of women is considerably  lower than that  of men.  On
average,  women devote to job  search 5 hours less per week than men.  Older workers
6  This  entails  the assumption  that the wage structure  does not change  so as to allow low  productivity
workers to price  themselves  into jobs.
The sample  consists  of all persons  who  report  that they are unemployed.  It is somewhat  larger  than  the
sample of persons  who  are defined  as unemployed  by jointly meeting the three  following  conditions:  do not
work for remuneration,  are available  for a job, and look  for a job.
s  This result does  not seem  plausible;  it may  spring  from a misinterpretation  whereby  job search is
equated with  job availability.
5spend looking for a job  somewhat longer than younger ones.  There is no distinct pattern
of job  search intensity  depending on  education.  For example,  the  unemployed  with
primary education spend on job  search the same amount of time  as university educated
workers.  Surprisingly,  unemployed  household  heads  do  not  search  for  a job  more
intensively than secondary earners:  spouses (usually wives), or children.
14.  The job  search effort does not depend  on the duration of unemployment.  The
long tem unemployed neither  increase their job  search intensity, nor  decrease it.  The
latter is a positive phenomenon,  as it indicates that the long term  unemployed  do not
become increasingly discouraged by the futility of their job search.
15.  The receipt of unemployment benefit does not seem to reduce  the search effort.
Contrary to what is usually assumed, in Bulgaria the recipients of unemployment benefits
tend to look for jobs  as intensively as those  who are not eligible.9 This means that the
disincentive effect usually created by the unemployment benefit system is not very strong
in Bulgaria.'0 However, registration at the labor office is not associated  with stronger
motivation to find a job: unemployed who are not registered at labor offices look for a job
as intensively as those who are.
16.  The job search effort is related to the search method.  Those who look for a job
the most actively - visit firms - spend the most time on job search (on average 24 hours
per week).  Those who confine themselves to visiting labor offices spend on average  8
hours  less.  In  between  are  those  who  look  for  a job  through  friends  (20  hours).
Unfortunately, we do not  know whether a more active and time  intensive job  search is
more effective than a more passive approach.
17.  Reservation  wages.  The  unemployed  in  Bulgaria  have  excessive  wage
expectations.  Their reservation wages - the lowest wages they are willing to accept - far
exceed the wages that employers actually offer.  Insofar this is the case, unemployment in
Bulgaria is not only a problem of insufficient labor demand and few vacancies, but also a
problem of the unemployed  not willing to work at the going wage  rates.  Interestingly,
the  unemployed have  almost  perfect  knowledge  on  premia  to  different  labor market
skills, however they err when it comes to the "baseline wage",  i.e. the intercept of the
earmings function.
18.  The  average  differential  between  the  reservation  wage  and  a  wage  that  is
predicted based on individual's  human capital characteristics is almost  100%.  In other
words  the unemployed  tend to  claim  wages  almost  twice  as  high  as  those they  can
9  Wadsworth  (1989)  found similar  regularity  for the UK. In fact, in  UK those claiming  benefit  search
harder  than non-claimants.  Moreover,  benefit  claimants  were found  maintaining  a closer attachment  to the
labor  market  and more  able to prolong  search  effort.
'  The disincentive  effect of the UB system in Bulgaria is also diminished by  relatively stringent
eligibility  conditions  and the low level of benefit. Only about 20% of all unemployed and 29% of the
registered  unemployed  receive unemployment  benefits. The benefit level is set at 60% of ones previous
wage with a cap of 1.5  times the minimum  wage. Given  that the minimum  wage varies around  30% of the
average wage this implies that unemployment  benefit does not exceed 45% of the average wage.  In
practice  the replacement  ratio is even lower (about 35% of the average wage) since the benefits  are not
adjusted  for inflation. The duration  of unemployment  benefit  varies between 6 and 12 months  depending
on age and  the contribution  record.
6actually receive.  This large disparity  between reality and expectations remains even if
one  allows  for  possible  underreporting  of  actual  wages.  This  means  that  wage
expectations of the unemployed are totally unrealistic and are likely to effectively prevent
them from getting a job.
19.  These  unrealistic  wage  expectations  are not  the result  of  a  misperception  of
returns to different human capital characteristics.  To the contrary, the unemployed seem
to  be  well aware  of their  relative  strengths  and  weaknesses.  In technical  terms, the
earnings function they implicitly use to  "estimate" their reservation  wage quite closely
matches  the actual  earnings  function  as  far  as  the returns  to  different  labor  market
characteristics are concerned.  The problem  is that the expected baseline earnings (the
constant term) are far too high.  These points are documented in Table 1.6.  It is indeed
amazing to see that the unemployed virtually perfectly "guess" the returns to education.
Furthermore, younger  workers expect  lower  earnings than more  experienced workers.
Women  expect  lower  earnings  than  men,  and  Gypsies  expect  lower  earning  than
Bulgarians  with  comparable  labor  market  skills.  They do  take  into  account  local
unemployment  and  relative  wage  conditions.  That  is,  they  have  almost  perfect
recognition of relative  wages.  The only thing that they do not recognize is the actual
wage level, which they tend to grossly overestimate.
Table 1.6 Determination of reservation wages and actual wages (OLS estimates)
Dependent variable
Independent  log Actual  log  Difference  Significance  1)
Variables  wage  Reservation  (* 100)
wage
Education, years  0.062  0.059  0.388  no
Age  0.019  0.049  -3.061  yes
Age2/100  -0.022  -0.054  3.236  no
Female  -0.273  -0.335  6.185  no
Turkish  0.081  0.007  7.361  no
Gypsy  -0.344  -0.320  -2.443  no
Other ethnicity  -0.167  -0.175  0.821  no
Reg. Unemployment  -0.011  -0.001  -1.029  yes
Reg. Wage  0.003  0.004  -0.043  no
Constant  10.755  9.493  126.227  yes
1)  Significance  of the difference  between  coefficients  at the 5 percent  significance  level.
Source:  IHS 1997.
20.  Excessive  wage expectations  are characteristic of all worker groups.  However
some groups are more unrealistic in  their expectations than other.  These are women,
younger workers, and workers with  college or university education.  Symptomatically,
except  for  college/university  educated  workers,  these  are  groups  among  which
unemployment is higher than the average.
721.  The longer duration of unemployment hardly moderates wage expectations.  Only
the unemployed for more than two years significantly scale down their reservation wages,
but still they bargain for wages  substantially (60%) higher than those prevailing on the
market.  It is usually assumed that job  search is adaptive, that is that reservation wages
fall  in  the  course  of  search.  There  is  little  evidence of  this  in  Bulgaria,  which  is
worrisome, as this lack of adjustment by itself prolongs job  search.
22.  Higher  intensity  of job  search  tends  to  moderate  wage  expectations,  but  the
relationship is weak.  The unemployed  who spend on the job  search less than an hour per
week tend to expect wages more than twice as high as those prevailing on the market.
Those who look for 8 hours or more are ready to accept wages "only" 75% higher than
the actual ones.
23.  The unemployed who use less'active  methods of job  search, such as reading ads
in newspapers or through friends  tend to have higher wage expectations than those  who
use more active methods and are exposed to the reality of the labor market.  For example,
those who confine themselves with reading ads in newspapers expect wages 120% higher
than they actually count on.  Those who visit firms want wages 80% higher; whereas the
clients of labor offices are the most modest in their wage claims and want wages that are
"only" 70% higher than those actually offered.
24.  Unemployed  registered  with  labor offices have  lower  reservation  wages  than
those who are not, although they still want wages that are higher than the actual ones.
One possible  explanation is that  persons who are exposed to  actual job  offers  tend to
moderate their wage claims.  Another possibility is, that this result merely reflects  self-
selection process, whereby it is less active and energetic persons who register with labor
offices and who a priori have lower wage expectations.
25.  The job  search theory suggests that the recipients of unemployment benefits  are
likely to have higher reservation wages than non-recipients.  The data for Bulgaria do not
support  this  hypothesis.  The  unemployed  registered  at  labor  offices have  the  same
reservation  wages irrespective  of whether or not they receive unemployment  benefits.
This is yet another piece of evidence suggesting that the unemployment benefit system in
Bulgaria  does not seem to  have a  distortionary impact on the effectiveness of the job
search of the unemployed.
26.  To  conclude, reservation  wages  of the unemployed  are much higher  than  the
wages they can actually receive,  given their human capital and labor market conditions.
These  excessive  wage  expectations  are  likely  to  prevent  many  unemployed  from
obtaining a job, prolong the job  search duration, and thus contribute to unemployment  in
Bulgaria.
Conclusions
27.  Since the outset of the transition the labor market in Bulgaria has been stagnant
and offers limited employment opportunities.  Labor force participation has been low and
8unemployment has been relatively  high.  Although the unemployment rate has recently
declined, a marked  increase in  unemployment is likely to  take place one the currently
stalled restructuring process starts to accelerate.
28.  The turnover  of the unemployment  pool is low.  An unemployment person has
low chances of finding  a job.  As a result many unemployed become discouraged and
withdraw from  the  labor force.  On average job  search duration  is long and thus  the
incidence  of  long  term  unemployment  is high.  This  is  a  worrisome  feature  of  the
Bulgarian labor market as the long term unemployed face increasingly lower chances of
finding a job  due to erosion of their skills.  As a result, high unemployment is likely to
persists even when the economic growth resumes.
29.  The unemployment problem  in Bulgaria is accentuated by the skills gap.  Many
unemployed will not be able to find a job even if there is enough vacancies because their
skills fall short of those required by employers.
30.  Young, low educated persons, especially of Gypsy origin, face the highest risk of
unemployment.  The  link between  low educational attainment  and  unemployment  is
particularly strong.  Thus, acquiring  more education provides the best protection against
unemployment.  Secondary earners  are more  often unemployed  than primary  earners.
However, often secondary earners  are looking for a job  because  they come from  poor
families.
31.  Many of the unemployed in Bulgaria do not look intensively for a job and confine
themselves  to  visiting  labor  offices.  At  the  same time,  they  have  excessive  wage
expectations, that is their reservation wages are much higher than what they can bargain
for.  These unrealistic expectations may contribute to the unemployment problem to the
extent the unemployed are not willing to accept job offering wages lower than what they
expect.
9II.  WAGE DEVELOPMENTS
Trends in real wages
32.  According to  official  statistics, real  wages  have  fallen  dramatically  since the
outset  of the transition  (Table 2.1).  Since 1995 real wages have further decreased by
about 30%.  As a result,  average wage in 1997 was less than two-thirds of that in 1991,
and less than 40% of its pre-transition value.
Table 2.1  Dynamics of real wages, 1990-1997
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Real wage index
PY=100  - 60.6  119.0  101.1  82.1  94.5  82.4  83.3
1990=100  100.0  60.6  72.1  73.0  59.9  56.6  46.6  38.9
1991=100  165.0  100.0  119.0  120.4  98.8  93.3  76.9  64.1
Source:  National  Statistical  Institute,  Bank  staff  calculations.
33.  The  degree of  the  wage  fall seems to  be  overestimated,  largely  as  a result of
problems with correct price measurement under the conditions of widespread shortages in
the consumer goods market,  which were prevalent under central planning and during the
early phase of the transition  in Bulgaria.  A price of a good has little meaning if at this
price the good is hardly available.  In particular the CPI might have been systematically
overestimated, if the base year prices were below the equilibrium level.
34.  In order to check the hypothesis that the fall in real wages is overestimated, we
constructed  a weekly basket of basic foods"' and calculated the number of baskets one
can buy for an average monthly wage in different years.  It turned out that the there have
been  no  substantial  changes  during the period  1991-1997.  By way  of  illustration, a
person earning average wage was able to buy 7.4 baskets in 1991, 8.8 in 1995 and 7.8 in
1997.
35.  Of course, this  is  a  simplistic exercise, as  it covers  a very  limited  number of
consumer  goods, and uses arbitrary weights.
12 Nonetheless,  it casts some  doubt on the
claim that the purchasing power of wages has shrunk dramatically during the transition.
With  a  reasonable degree  of confidence one  can claim, that the purchasing  power of
wages  in  terns  of  subsistence  food has  not  fallen  dramatically - a  finding  of direct
relevance for poverty analysis.
1  The basket included  bread, milk, meat,  cheese,  eggs, oil, butter, potatoes,  and  pasta.
12  That is, we assumed  how much of each  good is consumed  during  the week.
10Changes in the wage distribution
36.  The last two years have witnessed a  dramatic rise in earnings  inequality (Table
2.2).  The Gini coefficient - a summary measure of inequality - has sharply increased by
12 Gini points, reaching the level of 40.  By West European standards  this indicates a
very  high  level of inequality.  Similar values  of  the Gini  coefficient  are observed in
developing and in some of FSU countries.  By contrast, the Gini coefficient for transition
economies  of  Central  Europe  varies around  30,  and  ranges  from  25  to  30  in  West
European OECD countries (Rutkowski, 1996).
Table 2.2  Summary of earnings distribution, 1995 and 1997
1995  1997
National  National  Public  Private
economy  economy  sector  sector
Gini coefficient (*100)  28.1  40.0  39.3  41.5
PIO  57.7  44.6  43.8  44.1
P90  192.3  245.5  250.0  213.1
Decile ratio  3.3  5.5  5.7  4.8
Incidence of
Low pay  17.8  24.7  22.1  33.3
High pay  14.0  15.1  16.9  9.2
anwage2.0og
Notes:
P 10 denotes the earnings of the bottom decile relative to the median, expressed as a percentage.
The decile ratio is the ratio of earnings at the top decile to earnings at the bottom decile, i.e. P90/Pl O.
Low pay is defined as eaming lower than 2/3 times the median.
High pay is defined as earnings higher than 2 times the median.
Source:  Integrated  Household  Survey,  1995 and  1997;  World  Bank  staff calculations.
37.  The wage distribution has widened at both ends.  Low paid  workers have seen
their relative wage status substantially deteriorate.  In 1995 a worker  at the bottom decile
earned 58% of the median  wage, while now he earns only 45% of the median  (the PlO
ratio).  The wage gap between the bottom decile workers and the  median worker is in
Bulgaria much larger than in most European countries,  including transition  economies.
For example, in Poland (which is a medium to high wage inequality OECD country) the
wage of the bottom decile worker accounts for 57% of the median.
38.  Simultaneously,  the  relative  earnings  position  of  top  paid  workers  has
considerably improved.  Now a worker at the top decile eams a salary that is  2.5 times
higher than that of the median worker (the P90 ratio).  The relative  earnings position of
top paid workers in Bulgaria is better than in most European countries.  For example, in
Poland a top paid worker earns twice as much as the median worker.
1139.  The ranks  of  low paid workers  have swollen.  The  incidence of  low pay  has
increased by 7 percentage points from 1995 to 1997 and at present one in four workers is
low paid.  This is a huge increase to a very high level.  In OECD countries the percentage
of low paid worker  does not exceed 20%  even in high  wage  inequality countries.  In
Poland the proportion of low paid workers amounts to  18%.  In contrast, the proportion
of top paid workers has increased only slightly, by 1 percentage point, reaching 15%.
40.  The incidence of low pay is substantially higher in the private sector than in the
public sector.  In the private sector one-third of all jobs are low paid, compared with just
over one-fifth in the public sector.  Quite  surprisingly, it is the public sector that is the
primary source of good jobs.  In the public sector 17% of workers earn more than two
times the median  earnings (for the national  economy), while  in the private sector only
9%.  Thus,  in  Bulgaria,  unlike advanced  transition  economies,  the public  sector still
offers better jobs than the private.
41:  Such a rampant increase in earnings inequality is quite unusual, even by standards
of transition economies.  A possible cause is the runaway inflation  of  1997.  In some
firms workers were able to maintain the real value of their earnings, while in others they
were not. Moreover,  under high inflation monthly real earnings  are extremely volatile:
they go down in the wake of the price shock, then go up as workers strive to recoup the
purchasing power of their wages, and  this  cycle is likely to repeat.  In effect, earnings
dispersion at a given moment is always higher than the dispersion  of earnings averaged
over a longer period of time, say, one year.  If indeed the increase in wage dispersion was
an outgrowth of inflation, then it might  be the case the high  level of earning inequality
was a transitory phenomenon characteristic of 1997.
42.  Is  high  wage  dispersion good  or bad?  It  depends.  If  a  more  flexible wage
structure leads to the creation of more jobs,  then the net effect  on poverty may be well
positive.  If,  however,  the  widening  of  the  wage  distribution  does  not  bring  about
employment growth, then the impact on poverty is unambiguously  negative.  Given that
the  employment rate  has remained roughly  stable during  1995-1997, widening of the
wage distribution has not been coupled with growth in employment.  One cannot rule out
the possibility that unemployment would  increase if the wage  distribution not widened,
but this  hypothesis  does not seem very  plausible.  If so, then  the increase in  earning
dispersion, associated with the sharp increase in the incidence of low pay, has most likely
contributed to the growing poverty.
43.
Wage determination and relative wages
44.  This  section  examines the role  of different  factors  in  wage  determination.  In
particular, it looks at returns to labor market skills, the wage effects of unionism, and the
impact  of regional  unemployment.  These  factors determine  relative  wages,  in  other
words they determine  who is well paid and  who is low paid.  The analysis is largely
based on the results of the estimation of a set of earnings functions, which are presented
in Table 2.3.
12Table 2.3  OLS estimates of earnings functions
Dependent variable: log monthly earnings
National  Public  Private
economy  sector  sector
Education (Primary)
Secondary general  0.227  0.267  0.064
Secondary vocational  0.304  0.344  0.083
College  0.397  0.474  0.145
University  0.691  0.741  0.444
Job experience  0.014  0.013  0.028
Job experience2  -0.028  -0.022  -0.081
Female  -0.253  -0.261  -0.222
Ethnicity (Bulgarian)
Turkish  0.014  -0.066  0.281
Gypsy  -0.232  -0.199  -0.114
Other ethnicity  0.067  0.101 (dropped)
Trade union  0.087  0.109  0.016
Private sector  -0.085





Social services  -0.524
Public services  -0.197
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
N  1102  839  263
F  15.29  14.22  3.09
R2  0.270  0.304  0.237
Root MSE  .5805  .5644  .6112
Significant at 1 percent level
Significant at 5 percent level
Significant at 10 percent level
Not significant estimate
Note: The hypothesis  that earnings  functions  are identical  in the public  and the private  sectors  is rejected  at
the I percent significance  level  (using  standard  F-test)
45.  The  role of human capital.  High skills pay off in Bulgaria.  The trend  of the
increasing returns to education, incipient in the early phase  of the transition, continues,
and presently educational premia are higher than they were two years ago (in 1995).  For
example, all else equal, a worker with secondary general education earns on average 25%
more than a worker with primary education, a premium 10 percentage points higher than
13it  was  in  1995.'3  The premium  to  secondary vocational  education has  increased  to
similar  degree.  However,  the  premium  to  university  education  has  increased  most
dramatically, by 20 percentage points, and now a worker with an university degree earns
twice as much as a worker with primary education.  Educational premia in Bulgaria have
come to resemble those in advanced transition economies,  such as the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, as well as those prevailing in Western Europe.
46.  The pattern of relative wages observed in Bulgaria is untypical in that educational
premia  are substantially higher in the public than in  the private sector.  After  all, the
private  sector  offers virtually no  premia to  secondary  education and  even  to  college
education.  It does value university education but to a lower degree than the public sector
(55% premium over primary education, compared with  110% in the public sector).  This
is unusual,  as in advanced transition  economies of CEE as a rule it is the private  sector
which  drives the changes in relative wages, and in particular  offers significantly higher
returns to education.  The private sector in Bulgaria seems to be less skill intensive than
the public sector (even after controlling for industry composition), and thus demand less
highly qualified labor. This implies that a truly modern, skill and capital intensive private
sector, which can be an engine of growth, is yet to develop in Bulgaria.
47.  All else equal, the average wage in the private  sector is lower than in the public
sector by 9%.14  The private/public  wage differential  varies by educational  attainment
(Table  2.4).  All worker groups lose on private sector employment, regardless  of their
educational  attainment,  but  those  who  lose  the  most  are  workers  with  secondary
education (either general, or vocational, although the latter group loses more).  Earnings
of workers with primary education and university education are in the private sector only
slightly  lower  than in  the public  sector.  This  pattern  of no  gains  on  private  sector
employment  implies that no group  of workers has  a clear  (short-term)  interest  in  the
privatization of the economy.
1'  The relative  change in wage resulting  from an unit change  in variable x  is calculated  as  exp(b)-l,
where b is an estimated regression coefficient of x.  For "small" b, say b<O.2,  the relative change in wage =
b.
4  This result rests  on the assumption  that  private  sector  workers do not have a greater  incentive  to
underreport earnings than public sector workers.





Secondary general  -16.5
Secondary vocational  -25.2
College  -7.8
University  -2.2
All levels  -15.2
Source:  IHS 1997,  Bank  staff  calculations.
48.  The pattern prevailing  in  Bulgaria differs  considerably  from that  occurring  in
advanced transition economies.  For example, in Poland only workers with low or narrow
skills  lose on private sector employment, whereas  workers with secondary and tertiary
education gain.  Moreover, the gain is the greater the higher the educational attainment.
That is, workers with university degree are much better off in the private  sector than in
the  public  sector,  and  they  gain  substantially  more  than  workers  with  secondary
education (Rutkowski, forthcoming).  In contrast to Bulgaria, the private sector in Poland
is exhibits high demand for highly skilled labor.  This again supports the view that the
private sector in Bulgaria has developed largely on the low-skill margin of the economy.
49.  The returns to tenure with the current firm are low in Bulgaria.  Thus, wages of
younger  workers, with short tenure, are not  much  higher than those of older workers.
The  fall  in  returns to  experience  is  characteristic  of  most  transition  economies  and
reflects the fact that experience gained under the old regime is now of lesser value.  In a
way, this is a positive phenomenon, as it reduces the loss associated with changing a job,
and thus it is conducive to industrial restructuring.  Interestingly, returns  to experience
with  the  current  employer  are higher  in the  private  sector than  in the  public  sector.
However, workers employed in the private sector - which has developed just  recently in
Bulgaria - have much shorter tenure than those in the public sector.  ' 5
50.  The role trade unions.  Wages of workers employed in firms where trade unions
are present are significantly higher than in non-union firms (by 9%).  Similarly, members
of trade unions receive wages  significantly higher  than non-members with  comparable
human capital charactenstics.
15  The median worker's  tenure with the current employer  is 12 years in the public  sector and 3 years in
the private  sector.
16  Result based  on estimating  earnings  function  with "union member"  (rather  than "union present")  as an
explanatory  variable  (not  reported  in detail here).
1551.  Trade unions  in Bulgaria operate mainly  in public firms, while their presence in
private firms in negligible.1 7 Correspondingly,  the union wage effect  is visible only in
the public sector.  This partly accounts for wages in the public sector on average higher
than  in the  private  sector.  The strong  presence  of  unions in the  public  sector also
contributes to lower wage inequalities, as unions tend to exert egalitarian pressure.
52.  Role of gender and ethnicity.  Women earn on average 28% less than men with
similar human capital characteristics.  This  means that women have begun to close the
salary  gap with  men,  a  two years  ago  the  male/female  wage differential  in  Bulgaria
exceeded 30 percent.  Another positive development is that the relative wage position of
women  in  the  private  sector  has  improved  in  the  last  two  years.  Currently,  the
female/male salary differential in the private  sector is similar (in fact slightly smaller) as
in the public sector. In 1995 wage discrimination  of women was much more pronounced
in the private sector than in the public sector.
53.  Gypsies  earn  over  20%  less  than  Bulgarians  with  similar  observable
characteristics.  In this respect there is no change over the situation observed two years
ago.'8
54.  The role of regional unemployment  rate.  In Bulgaria regional unemployment
does not have a significant moderating impact on wages.  In other words, one is not able
to  discern the  existence  of the  so  called  "wage  curve",  whereby  "a  worker  who  is
employed in an area of high unemployment  earns less than an identical  individual who
works in a region with low joblessness"  (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, p.5).  This is
an important result which implies that in Bulgaria an equilibrating mechanism of higher
joblessness causing lower wages in not in place.  In other words, local wages do not seem
to  adjust  to  local  unemployment  and  this  rigidity  leads  to  the  persistence  of
unemployment.  This  is  in  contrast  to  majority  industrial  countries,  where  the
unemployment  elasticity  of  pay  is  around  -0.1,  i.e.  a  hypothetical  doubling  of
unemployment is  associated  with  a  drop  in  pay  of  10% (Blanchflower  and  Oswald,
1994).  The  fact  that  local  unemployment  does  not  play  a  significant  role  in  pay
determination benefits the insiders - those  who have a job - however at a considerable
social cost of higher unemployment.
55.  Industrial pattern of low pay.  Agriculture is by far the lowest paying industry,
even after controlling for workers' human capital characteristics. All else equal, wages in
agriculture are 90%  lower than in manufacturing.  Low paying industries also include
social services (education, health care, social welfare), where wages are on average 70%
lower than in manufacturing,  and trade  where  wages are 50% lower.  Low salaries in
social services are  characteristic  of historically  planned  economies  in  general, but  in
Bulgaria the gap seems particularly pronounced.  Given that social services are mainly
publicly financed, low salaries there reflect fiscal crisis faced by Bulgaria.
17  In the public sector, 72% of workers work in unionized  firms, while in the private sector the pertinent
figure is only 13%. Similarly,  42% of workers in the public sector  are union  members,  while only 6% are
in the private  sector.
'g  The estimate  of Gypsy/Bulgarian  wage grap  for 1997 is not significant,  probably  due to a small  sample
size.  However, the almost identical estimate for 1995 was highly significant.
1656.  Altogether,  the  low paying  industries account  for  38% of total  employment.
However,  as  many  as 46% of the working  poor have jobs  in these industries,  which
suggests that industry affiliation can be a separate risk factor conducive of poverty.
57.  Sources of earnings inequality.  The higher earnings inequality the  higher the
incidence  of  low  pay.  Which  factors  are  of  primary  importance  in  causing  wage
dispersion?  An answer to this  question is provided in Table  2.5.  Inter-industry  wage
differentials (industry rents) prove to be the most important  factor accounting for wage
inequality.  They  explain almost  10% of  total  variance  in  earnings and  36%  of  the
explained variance.  An important part is played by differences in educational attainment.
They explain  8.2% of total variance in earnings and 31.4%  of the explained variance.
Interestingly,  the  effect of  education  comes entirely  from  university  education.  The
gender wage gap contributes almost 5% to total earnings inequality and close to one fifth
to the explained inequality.  Other factors - experience, sectoral and regional affiliation -
are of secondary importance.
Table 2.5  Contribution of selected variables to log-earnings inequality.
In % of:
Variable  Total  Explained
variance  variance
Education  8.2  31.4
of which Tertiary  8.1  31.1
Job experience  0.7  2.7
Gender  4.6  17.5
Private/public  sector  1.3  5.0
Industry  9.5  36.3
Region  2.0  7.7
Total explained (R2)  26.2
Unexplained  73.8
Total  100.0
Note: The contribution of an variable x to the variance of the log-earnings w was calculated
as b*r(w, x), where b is the standardized regression coefficient in the earnings function, and r is the correlation
coefficient
The contribution of a categorical variable (e.g. education) is measured as a sum of
Contributions  by binary regressors representing each category (e.g. primary education,
Secondary education). The contribution of a single binarv regressor (e.g. tertiary education)
can be greater than the contribution of the categorical variable as a whole (e.g. education) if
the contribution of some other binarv regressors (e.g. primary education) is negative.
Source: Integrated Household Survey 1997; World Bank staff calculations.
58.  The predominant role played by industry rents in  generating wage dispersion  is
peculiar  to  Bulgaria.  As  a  rule,  it  is  differences  in  educational  attainment  which
contribute most  to wage dispersion.  Large inter-industry wage  differentials, which are
not  accounted for by differences in  the skill composition  of employment, point  to  the
17uncompetitve nature of wage determination in Bulgaria.  Highly  skilled persons who are
stuck in low paid government jobs are part of the problem.  However, the persistence  of
industry rents also indicates low inter-industry labor mobility and slow pace of industrial
restructuring.  Large  inter-industry wage  differentials are  an  likely  outgrowth  of  loss
making and subsidized public firms paying their workers wages  above the competitive
level.  For example, public firms in manufacturing pay wages  on average 25%  higher
than private firms.
59.  The existence of  substantial  industry  rents  distorts  and  reduces the  incentives
created by educational premia, as one's  earnings to a greater  degree depend on industry
of employment than on educational attainment.  In particular, many workers are low paid
not because of their failure to acquire skills, but because they are ratcheted in a "wrong"
industry.
60.  All in all, using a standard set of explanatory variables,  including human capital
factors, one is able to explain slightly over one-fourth of the total variance in earnings  in
Bulgaria.  We are doing somewhat better  at explaining earning  variation in  the public
than in the private sector (30% of total variance against 24%,  respectively).  These are
standard results; however one needs to bear in mind that our ability to account for wage
dispersion is limited.  A lot or room is left for unobservable, individual and firm specific
factors.
61.  Profile of low pay.  Low paid workers are first of all persons employed  in low-
paying industries, such as agriculture, trade, and - peculiar to Bulgaria - social services.
Another important factor conducive to low pay is low educational  attainment.  Women
are more likely to be low paid than men.  Workers employed  in the private  sector are
more often low paid than their public  sector counterparts.  By contrast, young age and
lack of labor market  experience are not  necessarily associated  with  low wages.  Also,
workers in regions with high unemployment are not more likely to be low paid than their
counterparts in low unemployment regions.
Conclusions on wage developments
62.  Real wages in Bulgaria have been falling since the outset of transition.  Only in
the last two years they decreased by about 30%.  However,  the actual fall in real wages is
probably overestimated.  A person earning  the average wage  could, roughly  speaking,
buy the same basket of basic foods in 1997 as in 1991.
63.  Since 1995 wage inequalities have dramatically increased, and are extremely high
by  European standards.  In practical  terns  this  means that  the  number  of  low  paid
workers is much higher and their relative  earning position is worse than it used  to  be.
The incidence of low pay is presently very high in Bulgaria.  However, the increase in the
number of low paid jobs does not entail a net increase in the number of available jobs.
Low paid jobs  are not additional jobs  but rather middle paying jobs  turned low  paying
jobs.
1864.  Low pay  is mainly  associated with  low  educational  attainment,  but  also with
working in a low paying industry, such as agriculture, trade and - peculiar to Bulgaria -
social services. Women earn significantly less than men with similar qualifications.
65.  Low paid jobs  are located largely in the private sector.  More generally, private
sector jobs  are less attractive than public  sector jobs.  In particular,  the private sector
offers substantially lower educational premia,  which is peculiar to Bulgaria, as in other
transition economies well educated workers are better of in the private sector than in the
public sector.
19III.  LABOR MARKETS  AND POVERTY
Labor market characteristics of the poor19
66.  The poor are less frequently  employed  than the non-poor and more  frequently
unemployed, or out of the labor force (Table  3.1).  Only one-third of the working age
poor are employed, compared with almost  one-half  of the non-poor.  The unemployed
account  for  16% of  the  poor  and  only  8%  of  the  non-poor.  Put  differently,  the
unemployment rate among the poor is over twice as high as among the non-poor: 33%
and 15%, respectively.  Thus, the poor are less economically active and less successful in
finding ajob than the non-poor.  Simultaneously, non-employment leads to poverty.
67.  Poverty is often associated with unemployment.  Over one-third of all poor comes
from families stricken by unemployment, that is from families where at least one member
is unemployed.  Obviously, unemployment is only one causes of poverty.  Many families
are  poor  because  of  economic  inactivity  (e.g.  due  to  old  age  or  disability),  or  low
earnings.
68.  Work does not prevent families from  poverty: the "working poor" 20 account for
34% of  all poor.  Not  surprisingly,  the  earning  capacity  of the poor  is  considerably
weaker than that of the non-poor.  As much as 35% of the poor are low-paid, 21 compared
with 23% of the non-poor.  However, many of the poor (55%) have middle paying jobs,
and some of them even well paying jobs  (10%) - which means that in some cases even
relatively high wages do not protect from poverty.
69.  The  poor  are  disproportionately  often  employed  in  agriculture  and  - quite
surprisingly - in social services, such as health  care and education.  One out of ten poor
persons has a job in agriculture, against one out of twenty of the non-poor.  Many of the
poor work in manufacturing (21%), but their  share of manufacturing jobs  is lower than
that of the non-poor (27%).
70.  While poverty is associated with agricultural  employment in many countries (as a
result  of  low-productivity  of  agricultural  jobs),  the  association  between  poverty and
social services employment is uncommon, since these sectors tend to be  skill intensive.
However, social service jobs  have been traditionally  low paid in virtually all historically
planned economies, and Bulgaria is not an exception.  Nonetheless, the disproportionate
employment  of  the  poor  in  social  sectors  in  Bulgaria  is  a peculiarity  that  is  worth
highlighting.
'9  The poor are defined here as persons in the bottom  quintile of per capita expenditure.  The sample is
limited to persons aged 15 or more, that is to persons who can participate in the labor force.
20  Working  poor  are poor families where  at least one person has a job.
2'  A workers is low paid if his earnings are lower than two-thirds of the median.
20Table 3.1  Labor market characteristics of the poor
Non-poor  Poor  All
In percent
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0
Labor force status
Employed  44.7  32.4  42.4
Unemployed  7.9  15.9  9.4
Out of the labor force  47.4  51.8  48.3
Earnings category
Low  23.2  35.0  24.7
Middle  47.6  55.0  48.5
High  29.3  10.1  26.8
Sector of employment
Public  76.6  71.0  75.9
Private  23.4  29:0  24.1
Industry of employment
Manufacturing  26.6  20.8  25.8
Construction  11.4  11.9  11.5
Agriculture  4.9  10.2  5.6
Transport &  9.9  7.6  9.6
communication
Trade  13.1  14.4  13.3
Social services  18.5  21.6  18.9
Public administration  15.7  13.6  15.4
Note:  Population  of working  age  (15  years  or  more).
Source:  IHS 1997
71.  The  poor  more  often  than  the  non-poor  are  employed  in  the  private  sector,
however this largely reflects the fact that agriculture, which is an industry of employment
for many poor, is predominantly private.
Households' labor market performance and poverty
72.  Household's  labor  market  performance  is  determined  by  two  variables:  the
number  of family  (household)  members who are employed,  and their  earnings.  Two
questions arise.  First, what is the impact of both variables on the poverty status? Second,
what  is  the  relationship  between  both  variables:  do  households  with  low  earnings
capacity tend to  increase labor supply, or to the contrary, low earnings go hand in hand
with low labor supply?
73.  How  strong is the  impact  of an increase in  the number of earners  on the
incidence of poverty?  Persons from households with two earners face a risk of poverty
4.8 points, or 28% lower than persons from households with only one earner (Table 3.2).
This  is  a  significant  reduction,  however  it  is  considerably  smaller  than  in  most
21countries. 22 Moreover, the poverty incidence among families  with two earners  is  still
quite high  (12.6%), much larger than in other countries, where  it is usually negligible.
For example,  in  Macedonia the differences  in the incidence  of poverty between  one-
earner families and two-earners families is 15.3 points, or 82%, and the poverty incidence
arnong two-earner  families is very low (3.3%).  Thus, Bulgaria does not conform to the
pattern observed  in many countries whereby "double earnship - both partners earning a
wage - appears to be an almost watertight guarantee against poverty," (Marx and Verbist,
1997).
Table 3.2  Poverty incidence by the number of earners in a household
Household  % of persons 1)  Poverty
employment rate  incidence
Zero  53.7  24.4
One-third or less  20.3  17.4
More than one-third  26.0  12.6
All households  100.0  19.9
Notes:
Household employment rate is the number of earners in the household per one household member.
If the household  employment rate is zero, this means that there are no earners in a household, if it is one-third,  this
means that there is one earners per three household members.  For example,  the household employment rate is equal
one-third in a family with a working husband, non-working wife and a child.  It will be one-fourth, in a family with a
working husband, non working wife and two children.  It will be two-fifths in a family with two working parents and
three children.  As long as there are two earners and the number of dependants  does not exceed three, the household
employment rate will be higher than one-third.  For practical purposes, the employment rate of one-third implies one
earner in the household, and the employment rate of more than one-third implies two earners.
1) Persons in households with given employment rate.
Source:  IHS  1997
74.  How  sensitive is poverty to changes in household wages?  The incidence  of
poverty  among  households having middle  earnings is  6.5  points,  or 28%  lower  than
among households having low earnings (Table 3.3).  Clearly, higher eamings reduce the
risk of poverty, but the reduction is moderate.  For example, in Macedonia households
with middle  earnings face the risk of poverty 8 points,  or 41% lower than households
with low eamings.
Table 3.3  The incidence of poverty by mean household earnings
Mean household eamings  % of persons 1)  Poverty incidence
Low  23.5  23.0
Middle  50.7  16.5
High  25.7  3.6
All households 2)  100.0  14.7
Notes:
Mean household earnings ("eaming capacity") are total household earnings divided by the number of earners.
Low earning capacity = mean household earnings lower or equal to 2/3 of the median.
22  Data  for OECD  countries  are provided  in (Marx  and Verbist,  1997),  data for  Macedonia  in
(Rutkowski  1998).
22Middle  earning  capacity  = mean  household  earnings  higher  than to 2/3 of the median  but lower  of equal  to
1.5  of the median.
High earning  capacity  = mean  household  earnings  higher  than 1.5  of the median.
1) Persons  in households  which  are in a given  earnings  category.
2) With  at least  one earner.
Source: IHS 1997
75.  The above results give rise to two questions: (i) why two earners do not protect  a
family from poverty, and (ii) why higher wages bring about only a moderate fall in the
risk of poverty? There are three possible answers:
(a)  Low  share of wage  income  in total  income  and/or  negative correlation
between wage and non-wage income;
(b)  Low variability of the number of earners and/or household wages (e.g.  if
all households had two earners, this would not be a factor protecting from relative
poverty);
(c)  Negative correlation between the number of earners and household wages
(e.g. low earning power is compensated for by a higher number of earners  in the
household);
76.  The first  factor - low share  of wage  income - is  likely  to play  a key  role  in
mitigating the impact of households'  labor market position on their poverty status.  A
relatively low poverty rate among households without earners illustrates this point.  More
rigorously this can be proven by showing that the two other factors are of no importance.
77.  The second factor - low variation in household employment and wages - does not
offer a satisfactory answer since the variation is not abnormally low in Bulgaria.  In fact,
as documented earlier, the wage dispersion tends to be higher than in other countries.
78.  The third factor - the correlation between household employment and wages - is
actually positive, not negative, and thus both variables reinforce their impact on poverty.
If the role of this  factor was not offset  by the low share of  wage  income, poverty  in
Bulgaria would be very sensitive to households'  labor market performance.
79.  The positive correlation between household earning capacity and the number  of
earners has important poverty implications and thus deserves further investigation.  Table
3.4 illustrates the pattern whereby households with low earning capacity tend to have less
earners than households  with high  earning  capacity.  As much  as 66% of high  wage
households  have  two  earners  in  contrast  with  55% of  low  wage  households.  Low
earnings and  low  labor  supply tend  to  go  hand  in  hand.  This  implies  that  income
inequality and thus poverty are higher than if earning capacity and employment rate were
negatively correlated.
23Table 3.4  The relationship between household earnings and employment
Mean household  Household employment rate
earnings  Less or equal to  Higher than 1/3  All households
I1/3
Low  46.6  53.4  100.0
Middle  37.2  62.8  100.0
High  34.0  66.0  100.0
All households  38.5  61.5  100.0
Source:  IHS 1997
80.  Poverty  is  often  a  result  of  both  low  earning  capacity  and  low  household
employment rate.  This point is summarized in Table 3.5., which  shows that the higher
the earnings of the household  head, the higher the earnings contributed by other family
members.  If a family head is in the top wage  quintile, other family members contribute
on average  four times more than in families where the head is  unemployed  and three
times more than in families where the head is in the bottom wage quintile.  Poverty tends
to be a result of the inability of the whole family to find productive,  well paying jobs.
Conversely, affluence tends to be a result of all family members joining  forces to earn a
decent living.  In poor households few people have jobs and the jobs  tend to be low paid.
In well-to-do households more people have jobs and the jobs tend to be well paying.
81.  This general pattern  is virtually unchanged if one looks only  at employed family
members.  If a household head is low paid, other family members are low paid, too.  Only
if the household head  is unemployed, secondary  earners try to make up for the loss of
income and eam somewhat higher wages.  Otherwise, their earnings "mirror" that of the
household head.
82.  What is the relative  importance of wages and  employment  in determining
household's  wage  income  and  poverty?  In  Bulgaria,  household  wage  is  a  better
predictor of poverty than the number of earners. 23  Moreover, the number of eamers plays
a  minor role in determining  variation in  household  wage  income,  compared with that
played  by  average household  wage.  This  is  in  contrast  with  Macedonia  where  the
relative role of the number of earners in a household  is much more important (Table 3.6).
An  interesting difference  between two countries  is  that  while  in  Bulgaria  household
wages  and  employment  are  positively  correlated,  they  are  virtually  uncorrelated  in
Macedonia.  This contributes to greater wage  income dispersion  in Bulgaria relative to
Macedonia.
23  The association  between  household  employment  rate and poverty  status is -0.286, and the association
between  household  earning capacity  and  poverty  status is -0.466, as measured  by Goodman  and Kruskal's
gamma coefficient  (which  ranges from  -1 to 1).
24Table 3.5  Average earnings of secondary earners by wage category of the household
head.
Average earnings of secondary earners (Leva '000)
Household head earnings  All household members of  Employed household
working age  members
Zero earnings (unemployed)  25  104
First quintile  33  70
Second quintile  41  86
Third quintile  58  107
Fourth quintile  62  116
Fifth quintile  98  171
Note: Non-employed  household  members  of working  age (15 years  of age or more) are attributed  zero
earnings. This  implies  that  the variable  under consideration  is average  earnings  of actual and  potential
secondary  earners.
Source:  IHS 1997.
Table 3.6 The determination of wage income in Bulgaria and Macedonia.
Bulgaria  Macedonia
Squared correlation coefficients for log wage income per capita
(%0)
Log average household wage  66.9  53.9
Log employment rate  41.6  45.3
Decomposition of variance in log wage income per capita (% of
total variance)
Variance in log average wage  58.8  54.7
Variance in log employment rate  33.4  46.1
Covariance *2  7.8  -0.8
Total variance in log wage income  100.0  100.0
per capita
Source:  IHS 1997,  Rutkowski  (1998)
25Unemployment, low pay, and poverty
83.  Local labor market conditions prove to be a significant determinant  of poverty
in Bulgaria (Table 3.7).  Holding  family socio-demographic characteristics  constant, a
lpercentage point increase in regional 24 unemployment rate leads to 0.6 percentage point
increase  in the  incidence of poverty.  Put differently,  a  10% increase  in  the regional
unemployment  rate brings about  a  1.1 percentage  points  increase  in  the poverty rate.
Regional wage conditions impact poverty, too.  A 10% increase in the average wage in
the region would cause a 2.1 percentage points fall in the incidence of poverty. 2 5
Table 3.7  Probit estimates of the impact of local labor market conditions on poverty
Probit  Estimates  Number  of obs  =  6656
chi2(15)  =  959.57
Prob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
Log Likelihood  =  -2854.7715  Pseudo  R2  = 0.1439
botm20  I  dF/dx  Std.  Err.  z  P>IzI  x-bar  [  95% C.I.  I
Reg uratel  .0063058  .0010191  6.18  0.000  18.115  .004308  .008303
Reg wage  I  -.0015045  .0002285  -6.54  0.000  143.866  -.001952  -.001057
Male*l  -.0410799  .0150495  -2.85  0.004  .855018  -.070577  -.011583
Age39*1  -.0548115  .0253077  -1.99  0.047  .136719  -.104414  -.005209
Age49*1  -.0341393  .0267072  -1.24  0.215  .267278  -.086484  .018206
Age99*l  -.0072817  .0280872  -0.26  0.795  .5628  -.062332  .047768
SecGen*l  -.0473816  .0145552  -3.01  0.003  .116887  -.075909  -.018854
SecVoc*l  -.0973557  .0116409  -7.51  0.000  .261268  -.120171  -.07454
College*1  -.0232561  .0201416  -1.11  0.268  .059645  -.062733  .016221
Univ*l  -.1193764  .0127486  -6.90  0.000  .095403  -.144363  -.09439
Turkish*l  .0628786  .0198087  3.41  0.001  .090895  .024054  .101703
Gypsy*l1  .4509685  .0309826  15.55  0.000  .063101  .390244  .511693
Other*1  .1582996  .0915969  1.99  0.046  .004808  -.021227  .337826
Nchild  I  .0527248  .0055945  9.46  0.000  .788161  .04176  .06369
Urban*l  .0075569  .0114638  0.66  0.512  .672025  -.014912  .030025
…--------+…___________________________________________________________________
obs.  P  I  .2004207
pred.  P  I  .1773379  (at x-bar)
------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------_
(*  dF/dx  is  for discrete  change  of dummy  variable  from  0 to  1
z and  P>!zI  are the  test  of the  underlying  coefficient  being  0
Source:  IHS 1997
24  Bulgaria  is administratively  divided into  nine regions (provinces).
25  Elasticities  are estimated  at the means.
2684.  Families hit by unemployment are more often poor.  All else equal, people from a family
stricken by unemployment (i.e. at least one family member  is unemployed) face odds of poverty
around  16% higher  than people from  families which  do  not  suffer  from unemployment  (Table
26 3.8).  This  is  a  significant (at  a  10%  significance  level)  although  not  a dramatic  difference.
Unemployment of a family member increases the risk that the family will be poor, but the increase
is modest.
85.  The  relationship  between  labor  market  status  of  household  members  and  poverty  is
summarized in Table 3.9.  While unemployment  of one family  member raises the risk of poverty
only  moderately,  the  "unemployment  syndrome',  when  two  or  more  family  members  are
unemployed  multiplies  it.  The  incidence  of  poverty  among  families  hit  by  unemployment
syndrome is 2.7 times higher than among families not stricken by unemployment.  In comparison,
the  incidence  of  poverty among  families where  one  person  is unemployed  is  "only'  1.3 times
higher.  As a result, 45% of people from families suffering from the unemployment syndrome are in
the bottom quintile of expenditure distribution.
26  This estimate  should  be treated  with due caution  as it is likely  to exhibit  an upward  bias. This results  from the
fact  that  poverty  and unemployment  of a family  member  are simultaneously  determined  and thus unemployment  is not a
truly exogenous  variable.  For example, some family may decide to look for a job - i.e. to become unemployed  -
because  of poverty.  This is likely  to lead to the "endogeneity  bias".  Correspondingly,  the regression  coefficient  (the
odds ratio)  provides an upper  bound  estimate  of the impact  of unemployment  on poverty.
27Table 3.8  Logit estimates of the impact of unemployment of a family member on poverty
Logit  Estimates  Number  of obs  =  6656
chi2(22)  =1065.21
Prob  >  chi2  =  0.0000
Log  Likelihood  =  -2801.9537  Pseudo  R2  =  0.1597
-------------------------------------------------------------------- __-------_
botm20  I Odds  Ratio  Std.  Err.  z  P>IzI  [95% Conf.  Interval]
--------- +…___________________________________________________________________
UE memb  1  1.164411  .094167  1.882  0.060  .9937308  1.364406
Male  I  .7894048  .0742166  -2.515  0.012  .6565584  .9491311
Age39  I  .701264  .1441429  -1.726  0.084  .4687264  1.049165
Age49  I  .7935878  .1541158  -1.190  0.234  .5423635  1.16118
Age99  I  1.000332  .191861  0.002  0.999  .6868882  1.456808
SecGen  .7071329  .0839176  -2.920  0.003  .5603848  .89231
SecVoc  I  .4924512  .0503959  -6.922  0.000  .4029527  .6018281
College  .8736764  .1305338  -0.904  0.366  .6518906  1.170918
Univ  I  .3199414  .0549439  -6.636  0.000  .2285033  .4479693
Turkish  I  1.812572  .2190602  4.921  0.000  1.430285  2.297038
Gypsy  !  8.073982  1.167926  14.439  0.000  6.080774  10.72054
Other  I  2.157909  .8962016  1.852  0.064  .9561377  4.870189
Nchild  I  1.41142  .0550035  8.843  0.000  1.30763  1.523449
Urban  I  .9613453  .0776594  -0.488  0.626  .8205738  1.126267
Iregio_2  I  .465549  .0736718  -4.831  0.000  .3414013  .6348421
Iregio_3  I  .5994887  .0871023  -3.522  0.000  .4509271  .7969952
Iregio_4  I  .8095248  .1154333  -1.482  0.138  .6121446  1.070548
Iregio_5  I  .4178399  .0777266  -4.691  0.000  .2901813  .601659-
Iregio_6  I  1.297696  .1681756  2.011  0.044  1.006609  1.672957
Iregio_7  I  .7788103  .1223909  -1.591  0.112  .5723536  1.059739
Iregio_8  I  1.387893  .1857901  2.449  0.014  1.067604  1.804272
Iregio_9  I  .3779052  .0610437  -6.024  0.000  .2753511  .5186556
----------------------------------------------------------- __----------------_
Source:  IHS  1997
28Table 3.9  Unemployment and poverty
Variable  Sample  Poverty  Poverty
share  share  incidence
Labor force status of household head
Employed  50.1  42.6  17.0
Unemployed  7.1  10.3  29.0
Out of the labor force  42.8  47.1  22.0
Unemployed household member
Yes  22.8  34.3  30.0
No  77.2  65.7  17.0
Number of unemployed household members
None  77.2  65.7  17.0
One  15.4  17.4  22.5
Head  3.5  2.4  13.9
Spouse  3.0  3.2  21.3
Son/Daughter  8.6  11.6  26.8
Two or more  7.4  19.9  45.4
Number of earners in the household 1)
None  53.1  65.7  25.0
One  21.2  16.0  15.2
Two or more  25.7  18.3  14.4
Note: Poverty  = bottom quintile  of per capita  expenditure  distribution.
1) Households  with at least  two persons  of working  age (16-64).
Source:  IHS 1997
86.  The risk of poverty critically hinges on the labor force status of the family's head.
Among families where  the head is unemployed,  the incidence of poverty is  1.7 higher
than among those where the head is employed.  However, this risk ratio to a large extent
reflects  the fact  that  often the unemployment  of the household  head  is coupled with
unemployment of another household member.  If one focuses on households where only
one person is unemployed, then actually the incidence of poverty is higher in households
where unemployed are secondary earners (spouses or children), than in households where
unemployed is the head.  This unexpected result may reflect that unemployment often is
the  effect  as  well  as  the  cause of  poverty.  Specifically,  secondary  earners in  poor
households have a stronger incentive to look for a job, and thus be unemployed if the jobs
are not available.  In simple terms, in poor families children often need to look for a job,
while in well-to-do families they can afford to be out of the labor force (e.g. to study), or
have better chances to have a job (for example, because they are better educated).
87.  It is often assumed that unemployment of secondary earners, in contrast to that of
primary earners, is not indicative of poverty.  The rationale behind this view is that the
impact  of  the  unemployment  of  secondary  earners,  e.g.  young  family  members,  is
mitigated by employment of the primary earner and possible other family members.  The
pattern  observed  in Bulgaria  does not conform  with  this view.  Table  3.10 shows the
29associations between one's  labor force status and poverty.  It proves that, contrary to the
received wisdom, unemployment of secondary earners often does translate into poverty.
Table 3.10  Incidence of poverty by individuals' labor force status
Labor force status
Employed  Unemployed  Inactive
In percent
All workers  14.3  31.6  20.0
Males  14.3  32.0  19.0
Females  14.3  31.3  20.8
Young (15-24)  17.4  33.1  19.7
Prime age (25-54)  14.1  31.8  27.8
Older(55+)  12.6  13.3  18.3
anpoori3 log
Note: An individual is considered poor if he is in the bottom quintile of per capita expenditure distribution.
Source: Integrated Household Survey 1997; World Bank staff calculations.
88.  Unemployed women  are as often poor  as unemployed men.  Both unemployed
women  and  men are  over  two  times  more  likely  to  be  poor  than  their  employed
counterparts.  Thus, in Bulgaria female unemployment has equally detrimental impact on
poverty as male unemployment.
89.  Young unemployed workers are somewhat more likely to be poor than prime age
workers.  However, the high  incidence of poverty  among unemployed  youth  can only
partly  be  attributed  to  unemployment.  In  fact,  in  the  case  of  young  persons
unemployment  increases the  risk  of poverty  (relative  to  that  faced  by  an  employed
person)  somewhat  less  than  in  the  case  of  prime  age  workers.  Interestingly,
unemployment does not seem to harm older workers.
90.  The fact that unemployment raises the risk of poverty less in the case of young
workers than  in the case of  older workers does  not  imply that  youth  unemployment
should be of no concern. First, the increase in the risk of poverty due to unemployment is
significant  even in  the  case  of  young workers.  Second, and  more  importantly,  the
poverty incidence among unemployed youth is very high, in fact somewhat higher than
among prime age workers.
91.  Families with a low paid household member are not disproportionately  often
poor.  Paradoxically, the presence  of a low paid family member  is  associated with  a
lower risk of poverty (Table 3.  1 1). The likely reason for this is that often low paid family
members are secondary earners who supplement income provided by primary earners.  In
other words, families with a low paid earner are often two-earner families, which reduces
the risk of poverty.
92.  However, if a household head is low paid, and especially if both the primary and
the  secondary  earners are  low  paid  then  the  risk  of  poverty  increases.  Still,  it  is
30substantially lower than among families hit by unemployment.  This reflects the simple
truth that it is better to have ajob,  even if it's a low paid job, than to be jobless.
93.  Having a low paid job  not necessarily leads to poverty (while not  having a job
does).  The incidence of poverty among low paid workers is not much higher than among
middle paid workers (Table 3.12).  It is only high  wages (above 1.5 times the median)
that substantially reduce the risk  of poverty.  This  has  important policy  implications:
raising the minimum wage will not bring about a significant reduction in the incidence of
poverty.  To  the  contrary,  it  can  increase poverty  to  the  extent  it  leads  to  higher
unemployment.
Table 3.11  Low pay and poverty
Variable  Sample  Poverty  Poverty
share  share  incidence
Wage status of household head
Low  18.9  34.7  24.5
Middle  42.8  51.2  15.9
High  38.3  14.1  4.9
Low paid household member
Yes  61.7  32.8  17.1
No  38.3  67.2  21.7
Number of low paid household members
One  22.5  17.7  15.8
Head  7.1  7.1  20.0
Spouse  8.4  4.7  11.2
Son/Daughter  7.0  5.9  17.0
Two or more  15.8  15.0  19.0
Note: Poverty = bottom quintile of per capita expenditure distribution.
Source: IHS 1997
31Table 3.12  Incidence of poverty by individuals' wage status
Earnings level
Low  Middle  High
In percent
All workers  17.4  14.0  4.6
Males  19.6  13.9  4.7
Females  15.9  14.1  4.4
Young (15-24)  18.9  15.1
Prime age (25-54)  17.7  14.3  4.9
Older (55+)  10.5  9.6  3.9
Definition  of earnings  categories:
Low  earnings  = earnings  below  2/3 times  the median  earnings;
Middle  earnings  = eanings between  2/3 and 1.5  times  the median  earnings;
High  earnings  = earnings  above 1.5 times  the median earnings.
Source:  Integrated  Household  Survey 1997; World  Bank  staff calculations.
94.  Low paid men are more often poor than low-paid women.  At the same time, men
benefit more from higher earnings.  If a men moves from  a low-paying job to a middle
paying job his risk of poverty is reduced by almost 30%, while in the case of a women it
is reduced by only  11% . A probable  explanation of this  is that low-paid men are often
primary earners whose families live  on their single  earnings.  In contrast, women  are
often secondary earners, who provide additional income which takes their family out of
poverty.  This implies that the greater availability of low paid jobs, which can be taken by
secondary earners - including women  - may have a positive impact on poverty.  In this
context, the widening of earnings  distribution - if  it gives rise to  more jobs - can be
beneficial from the viewpoint of poverty reduction.
95.  Young workers suffer from low wages to the same degree as prime age workers.
That is low paid young people do not face a lower risk of poverty than older workers, to
the contrary, they are more vulnerable.  For them getting a middle paying job reduces the
probability of poverty by 20% - to the same extent as in the case of prime age workers,
but substantially more than in the case of older workers (who even if low paid are seldom
poor).  This means that in Bulgaria young workers are not necessarily secondary earners,
whose low earnings are compensated by higher earnings of other family members.  It also
means that young low-paid workers often live in poor farnilies and their contribution is
not sufficient to take their family out of poverty.
Conclusions
96.  The effective labor supply of the poor is much  lower than that of the non-poor.
The poor are disproportionately often unemployed or out of the labor force.  The latter
category is likely to include "discouraged  workers": persons who would like to work, but
ceased their job search effort when it proved futile.
3297.  Many of the poor do work, but their "earning power" is weaker than  that of the
non-poor.  Thus, the "working poor"  account for a substantial proportion of all poor.  To
a  large  extent  this  reflects the  fact  that  the  poor  are  employed  in  low  productivity
industries, such as agriculture.  However,  many of the  poor have low paying  jobs  in
social services.
98.  In worker  families poverty  is  a consequence  of  low earning capacity  and  low
effective labor supply.  Importantly,  both factors tend to  go hand  in hand:  households
with  lower  earning power tend  to  have a  lower number  of earners.  In  other  words,
households  with  low earning  capacity  are not  willing  or  not  able  to  overcome  their
disadvantage by increasing the number of working family members.
99.  Poverty in Bulgaria is linked to local labor market  conditions.  The incidence of
poverty is higher in regions where the unemployment rate is higher and the going wage is
lower.  Poverty seems more sensitive to changes in the wage level than in unemployment.
A  10 percent  increase in  the average  wage  in the region  would  bring  about  a  larger
reduction in poverty than a 10 percent fall in the unemployment rate.
100.  All  else being equal,  families hit  by unemployment  are  more often  poor  than
families that are not.  However, the presence of an unemployed family member  increases
the risk of poverty only moderately.  It is the "unemployment  syndrome", when  two or
more family  members,  including  the  household head,  are  unemployed  which  pushes
families into poverty.
101.  Unemployment  of secondary  earners, including  youth  and  women,  is  as often
associated with poverty as that  of primary earners.  Thus,  in the Bulgarian  context the
view that unemployment of secondary earners should be  of less concerns as it does not
have a  strong  impact  on poverty  is  not  valid.  Better  employment  opportunities  for
secondary earners are key to reducing poverty.  This involves the growth in the number
of  low paid jobs  (for  example  in  services) which,  is  likely  to  contribute  to  poverty
reduction, providing that these jobs reduce unemployment among secondary earners.
102.  Families with an low-paid earner are not disproportionately often poor.  Similarly,
having a low-paid job not necessarily leads to poverty.  However, households where the
two earners, including the household head, are low paid are at a high risk of poverty.REFERENCES
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Economic  transition in Bulgaria has  been associated  with the
emergence  of unemployment,  the fall in real  wages  and a substantial
increase  in wage inequality.  The ranks  of low paid workers have
grown, and their relative  wage  status  has  substantially  deteriorated.
Unemployment is of long duration. A part of the problem is that
the unemployed  have  excessive  wage  expectations.  Their  reservation
wages  far  exceed  the  wages  that employers  actually  offer  for people
of given qualifications. The reservation  wages  hardly fall with the
duration of unemployment,  which implies that job search  is not
adaptive.  The receipt of unemployment benefits  does  not seem  to
reduce  the job search  effort. The  transition hit the hardest  the low
skilled workers  among  whom both the incidence  of unemployment
and low-pay is the highest.  Poverty  in Bulgaria  tends  to be a result
of both low (relative) earnings  and low household labor supply,
which often go hand in hand. However, work does not keep
families out of poverty: the 'working poor' account for one-third
of all poor. Moreover,  poverty incidence is quite high even  among
families with two earners.  Thus, Bulgaria  does not conform to the
usually observed  pattern whereby two earners  effectively protect
against  poverty.
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